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Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A
Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois
Michael C. Herron
Alan E. Wiseman

Dartmouth College
The Ohio State University

Redistricting politics in Illinois provide a novel opportunity for testing competing theories of law making. With this
in mind, we demonstrate that the post-2000 Census redistricters in Illinois, dominated by Democrats, strategically
reshuffled district demographic profiles in an attempt to convert relatively liberal Republican districts to
conservative Democratic districts in the state Senate while decreasing and increasing the ideological diversity of
the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in the House. Such reshufflings suggest that legislative politics in
Illinois are conducted in a manner consistent with vote-buying theories of coalition formation.

I

n almost every state controversy arises following a
decennial census over who, or which political
party, creates new legislative districts to accommodate the distribution of a state’s population.
Notwithstanding the requirement of equal district
sizes as dictated by Reynolds v. Sims (1964), redistricters can promulgate maps in accordance with any
number of objectives. Possibilities include insulating
incumbent legislators against electoral challenges and
diluting or accentuating the electoral influence of
different political or ethnic groups. Redistricting can
also ostensibly be used to alter the ideological composition of a legislature to shape the electorally
induced preferences of a legislature’s median voter
or other relevant pivotal voters.
We address this latter possibility by considering
the post-2000 Census state legislative redistricting
process in Illinois. This process, which was controlled
by a majority Democrat commission, culminated in
an election in which the Democratic Party increased
the size of its majority in the Illinois House and took
control from the Republican Party of the state Senate.
The Illinois redistricting plan, and in fact the many
state legislative redistricting plans implemented across
the country in recent years, offer numerous opportunities for research on law making. The key to
linking theories of law making and redistricting is
identifying the strategies employed by redistricters, in
our case Illinois Democrats, and the technique we
propose is general. Our applying it to Illinois is
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largely a function of data availability and of Illinois’s
dynamic political environment.
We begin by characterizing the relationship between
Illinois General Assembly district demographics and
legislator ideology, and we then determine for both
chambers in the bicameral Assembly how legislator ideologies were predicted to change following
redistricting. Once we understand how Illinois redistricters attempted to influence the distribution of
legislator preferences with a new district map, we
then link the strategy used by these officials to the
organization of legislative politics in Illinois. Because
various theories of law making have implications for
redistricter behaviors, we can use observed behaviors
to understand which theory most accurately characterizes Illinois legislative politics.
When using redistricting outcomes to test competing theories of law making, it is appropriate to
focus at the state level rather than on Congressional
redistrictings. Makers of state legislative maps operate
independently of one another: for any redistricting
plan in a given state, there is a plausible relationship
between the plan and changes in the state’s legislature
which presumably translates into policy outputs.
This relationship is not contingent on the decisions
of other state actors, i.e., Illinois redistricters do not
condition their behavior on anticipated redistricting
in, say, Ohio, and a redistricting map’s influence on
the Illinois legislature is independent of the choices
made by Ohio redistricters. A similar analytical
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strategy that focused on the Congress, where any
change in either chamber is the product of redistricting strategies and elections in 50 states (which
may or may not be coordinated) would not be
fruitful.
Our findings indicate that the Democratically
dominated post-2000 redistricting in Illinois was
not designed to have a strong effect on the median
Illinois Representative or Senator. Nonetheless, we
identify notable shifts in expected post-redistricting
Democratic and Republican Party medians in the
Illinois Senate and expected increases and decreases
in the ideological diversity of Republicans and Democrats, respectively, in the Illinois House. As we show
later, these latter changes made House members of
both parties who were located near the legislative
median more amenable to Democratic preferences.
Moreover, in the Senate redistricters sought to convert relatively liberal Republican districts to relatively
conservative Democratic districts, thus shifting the
median Democrat and Republican in a conservative
direction, while in the House, redistricters focused
attention on trying to pull legislators of both parties
that were near the legislative median in a leftward
direction.
This type of redistricting strategy does not reflect
simple seat maximization by Democratic redistricters, and it is not obviously consistent with key
implications of conventional majoritarian or strong
party theories. However the strategy that we believe
Illinois redistricters adopted is consistent with certain
implications of ‘‘vote-buying’’ theories of law making
that allow for side payments between members in
exchange for votes.
We now briefly discuss how our work contributes
to existing literature on redistricting, we consider
competing theories of law making, and we provide a
description of the politics of the post-2000 Census
state legislative redistricting process in Illinois. We
then discuss data collection and statistical methods
and present results. We conclude with caveats and a
discussion of the implications of our results for
research on parties in legislatures.

Previous Research
A wide body of research examines how parties have
tried to enhance their seat shares through redistricting.
Abramowitz (1983) and Campagna and Grofman
(1990), for example, show how parties that control
redistricting processes tend to experience higher

swing ratios than out parties in elections following
redistricting.1 Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999) develop
a formal model of the efficient partisan gerrymander
and demonstrate empirically that the amount of
partisan bias in a redistricting plan is positively related to the size of the voting population but negatively related to the available number of legislative
seats. Cain’s (1985) study of the 1980 redistricting in
California identifies cases in which Democrats (who
controlled the redistricting process) systematically
converted marginally Republican districts to Democratic districts.2
While it seems plausible that benefits would
accrue to those parties in control of redistricting,
this matter remains debatable.3 Niemi and Jackman
(1991) and Niemi and Abramowitz (1994) directly
challenge Abramowitz’s earlier redistricting studies in
arguing that party swing ratios are not consistently
related to redistricting politics. Basehart and Comer
(1991) and Glazer, Grofman, and Robins (1987) also
question the relationship between redistricting control and seat ratios.
Such contradictory views highlight the possibility
that the partisan benefits of redistricting process
control might manifest themselves in a more subtle
form than seat switches. This suggests that one might
investigate the ways in which redistricting affects the
preferences, or ideal points, of elected legislators as
opposed to their partisan affiliations. Such an analytical strategy is consistent with recent scholarship
that describes how variations in district demographics influence legislator roll-call voting.
Sharpe and Garand (2001), for example, identify
how an increase in a legislator’s African-American
constituency contributes to liberal movements in his/
her roll call-based ideal point; Cameron, Epstein, and
O’Halloran (1996) argue that African-American substantive representation can be maximized by concentrating African Americans into districts that are less
than 50% majority African American in the South
and spreading them evenly throughout congressional
districts in nonsouthern states; in addition, Epstein

1
A ‘‘swing ratio’’ is the rate at which a party’s popular vote share
translates into a legislative seat share.
2
Gelman and King (1994) provide a review of these various
findings in their analysis of the determinants of bias and
responsiveness in state legislative redistrictings. More recently,
Cox and Katz (2002) provide a detailed assessment of the existing
literature in this area in their work on the representational effects
of Baker v. Carr.
3

This point is underscored in McDonald’s (2004) recent synthesis
of the state legislative redistricting literature.

gerrymanders and theories of law making
and O’Halloran (1999) demonstrate that packing
African Americans into the maximum number of
majority-minority districts can actually produce conservative legislative medians. Shotts (2002) develops a
formal model of gerrymandering in which demographic manipulation influences the preferences of
elected representatives and subsequent legislative
policy outputs.4 These findings collectively illustrate
how redistricting (racial or otherwise) contributes to
changes in legislator policy preferences.5

Studying Redistricting to Test
Theories of Law Making
As theories of legislative politics have become more
sophisticated, scholars have recognized the need for
tests of the theories that do not rely exclusively on
roll-call voting.6 Recent contributions in this vein
have focused on roll rates (Cox and McCubbins
2002), voting cutpoints (Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and
Woon 2005), committee assignments (Krehbiel 1993;
Krehbiel and Wiseman 2001), and comparative historical analysis (Jenkins 1999).
It is in this tradition that we advocate the use of
redistricting data as a new avenue for theory testing.
By stepping outside the legislature and identifying
how one party tried to influence legislative composition and legislator preferences through redistricting,
we can infer the party’s expectations regarding the
conduct of legislative politics; this informs us about
how parties interact with their elected members. In
advancing this approach we assume that partisan
redistricters, like legislators, have well-defined policy
4
Shotts (2001, 2003) develops models that analyze the electoral
and policy effects of race-based gerrymanders.
5

Such game-theoretic treatments of racial redistricting have been
criticized by Lublin (1999) and Lublin and Voss (2003), yet these
critics agree (Lublin 1997; Lublin and Voss 1998) that racial
redistricting has nontrivial consequences for policy preferences.
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preferences that are single-peaked with an ideal point
that is generally more extreme than the median
legislator of their parties. We also assume that these
redistricters correctly understand how legislative
policies are created.7 If there is a relationship between district demographics and legislator preferences, then any particular redistricting plan will
induce the election of particular types of legislators
leading to the creation of particular types of public
policies. If a redistricter has expectations regarding
how district maps translate into policies, one might
ask, how will a partisan redistricter try to restructure
districts to achieve his/her policy goals? The way
that a redistricter would answer this question hinges
on how law making occurs, and we explore the
implications of this by considering three theories of
legislative politics: majoritarian, strong party, and
‘‘vote-buying.’’
Majoritarian Theories. We posit first a purely
majoritarian model of law making in the sense of
Black (1958), where legislators have single-peaked
preferences over a unidimensional policy space and
all policy matters are considered under open amendment rules. As illustrated in Figure 1, for any status
quo policy that comes up for consideration in a
majoritarian legislature, the new policy outcome
associated with that status quo will be located at
the legislative median’s ideal point. If parties are
policy motivated, with Democrats to the left of
Republicans (where Dr and Rr denote the ideal points
of the Democratic and Republican redistricters,
respectively) then a majoritarian model predicts that
the party in control of redistricting (Illinois Democrats in our case) will seek to move the legislative
median towards its policy interests, e.g., leftward,
from m to m’. Hence, one would predict that chamber
medians in the postredistricting, 2003–04 Illinois
General Assembly would be more left-leaning than
they were in the pre-redistricting, 2001–02 General
Assembly. More formally,

6
On this point, see Groseclose and Snyder (2003), Krehbiel (1999,
2003), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001), and Snyder and
Groseclose (2000).

Hmajoritarian : New Chamber Median
, Old Chamber Median;

7
We deviate from the canonical Downsian (1957) model by
arguing that party elites have explicit policy preferences and try to
realize their policy goals rather than viewing policy platforms as
instruments for electing candidates. This assumption is consistent
with the view that partisans sort into parties based primarily on
their own policy preferences (e.g., Snyder and Ting 2002). The
assumption that partisan redistricters (and elites, more generally)
tend to be ideologically more extreme than the legislators in their
parties is consistent with theoretical work by Londregan and
Romer (1993) and Wiseman (2006) who demonstrate how
partisan activities in the electoral arena can influence the ideology
of candidates.

where ‘‘New’’ refers to post-redistricting and ‘‘Old,’’
pre-redistricting.
Strong Party Theory. In contrast to majoritarian
theories, Cox and McCubbins (2002, 2005) posit that
parties in the U.S. House (and presumably, other
legislatures) have an active role in legislative policymaking, that the majority party leadership exercises
agenda control by deciding what issues come up
for votes, and that bills are considered under open
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Policy Outcomes under Majoritarian Model
All Status Quo Policies Collapse to m

Dr

m’

amendment rules. In this setting, a majority party can
ensure that its more favored policies do not converge
to the chamber median by simply keeping them off of
the agenda, i.e., by exercising negative agenda control.
Central to Cox and McCubbins’s thesis is that
parties acquire and maintain majority status, which
provides them with agenda control. With respect to
redistricting, then,
1
Hstrong
party : The party that controls redistricting
should acquire and=or maintain majority status:

Beyond this primary prediction, one can extract
several auxiliary hypotheses relevant to strong party
theories. As illustrated in Figure 2 (top), the scope of
a majority party’s agenda-setting power per Cox and
McCubbins is positively related to the distance
between the majority party median (D) and chamber
median (m): the greater this distance, the larger the
range of policies that the majority party can keep off
of the agenda. Assuming that partisan redistricters
are more ideologically extreme than the median
legislators of their party, then these individuals
would be concerned with making the chamber
median more amenable to their interests so that
new policies enacted at the median favor their
preferences; they would also seek to expand the
scope of influence the majority party had over the
agenda to ensure that a wider range of favored
policies could be kept from floor consideration
altogether rather than be relocated to the median
voter’s ideal point.8 Taken together, Democratic

Rr

m

redistricters should seek several specific changes
for a postredistricting legislature. First, the new
chamber median should be more left-leaning than
the previous median; second, the new Democratic
Party median should be more left-leaning than the
previous Democratic median; and third, the distance
between the Democratic Party median and the
chamber median should be greater than the distance
between these two pivotal members. As illustrated in
Figure 2 (bottom), such changes ensure that the
scope of the majority party’s agenda-setting power
increases and that outcomes are more left-leaning
(due to a more left-leaning chamber and Democratic party median) in a new General Assembly
than in the old.9 Formally,
2
Hstrong
party : New Chamber Median
, Old Chamber Median
3
Hstrong
party : New Majority Party Median
, Old Majority Party Median
4
Hstrong
party : jNew Majority Party Median
 New Chamber Medianj .
jOld Majority Party Median
 Old Chamber Medianj

Vote Buying: Unlike a majoritarian theory that
provides no explicit role for parties and Cox and
McCubbins’s theory wherein a majority party exercises agenda control, Snyder’s (1991) model of
legislative vote buying analyzes political interactions
in which members vote based on their policy
9

8
We are not arguing that partisan redistricter’s goals might be to
expand the range of agenda control for the sake of increasing
gridlock per se. Rather we argue that redistricters seek final
policies (or maintained status quos) as close to their ideal points
as possible. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the leftward movement
of the chamber and Democratic Party median ensures that the
final policies implemented at the median voter’s ideal point, as
well as the maintained status quo policies are closer to Dr than
prior to redistricting.

The locations of status quo policies that leaders seek to influence
are highly relevant to this hypothesis. Cox and McCubbins (2002,
112) assume that the status quo in period (t) is identical to the
status quo at the end of period (t 2 1) plus an exogenous shock
that is realized prior to (t). Or more formally: SQt 5 SQt21 + et.
While Cox and McCubbins do not make explicit assumptions
about the distribution of et, we assume that et ; U[2k, k], where
k . |D|, and D is the location of the Democratic (majority) party
median. Hence, each new period presents sufficiently extreme
status quo points that the majority party would like to keep off
the floor agenda.

gerrymanders and theories of law making
F IGURE 2

155

Policy Outcomes under Strong Party Model, Pre- and Post-Redistricting
(Pre-Redistricting)
These Status Quo These Status Quo Policies
Policies Collapse to m Stay off of the Agenda

2D - m Dr

D

m

These Status Quo Policies
Collapse to m

Rr

(Post-Redistricting)

(2D – m)’

Dr D’

preferences and the amount of favors provided to
them by vote ‘‘recruiters,’’ who could be party
leaders.10 More specifically, let legislator i’s utility
function be
Ui ¼ ðxi  xÞ2 þ b;
where xi is legislator i’s scalar ideal point, x is a policy
under consideration, and b $ 0 is the amount of
transfers that the legislator receives from a vote
recruiter who prefers a new policy over the status
quo.11 Hence, legislator i will vote for the new policy
a over the status quo q if

m’

Rr

ideal point.12 Furthermore, the total amount of
bribes paid out is increasing in the distance between
the left-leaning a and the chamber median and is also
increasing in the number of legislators located
between a þ2 q and xm, with those closest to the median
receiving the largest payments.
To minimize costs associated with vote buying, a
Democratic redistricter would try to decrease the
distance between the chamber median and any leftleaning policy a (which yields an identical prediction
as what follows from majoritarianism). Following
redistricting, then, the new chamber median should
be more left-leaning than the old. Formally,

ðxi  aÞ2 þ b $  ðxi  qÞ2
0b $ 2xi ðq  aÞ þ a2  q2 :
If the key vote-buyer in the General Assembly is
the Democratic party leader, it is obvious that, if the
status quo policy is right of center as illustrated in
Figure 3 (top), for any left-leaning policy a advocated
by the Democratic leadership the vote buyer will
purchase the votes of all members who have ideal
points between ½a þ2 q; xm  where xm is the median voter’s
10
For the sake of parsimony, we adopt Snyder’s original language
and refer to vote recruiters ‘‘bribing’’ legislators for their votes,
which is not meant to imply that cash-in-hand transfers for votes
occur in Illinois.
11

A quadratic specification for a legislator’s utility is chosen for
analytical convenience and is not crucial.

1
: New Chamber Median
Hvotebuying
, Old Chamber Median:

In addition, as seen in Figure 3 (bottom), a redistricter
can also decrease vote-buying costs by decreasing the
number of members whose votes are necessary to buy
or by making them less expensive by making those
legislators located between a þ2 q and xm more liberal in
the new legislature. To the extent that legislators whose
preferences lie within this interval are Democrats or
Republicans, shifting their preferences leftwards will
lead to changes in the ideological cohesiveness of the
parties whereby ceteris paribus Democrats become

12

The Illinois legislature has no supermajority requirement
analogous to a filibuster in the U.S. Senate.
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F IGURE 3

Vote-Recruitment Strategies under Vote-Buying Theory
“Buy” votes of
legislators in this
interval
(Pre-Redistricting)
a+q
2

a

v1

v2

v3

q

v4

v5

m

v7

v8

v9

v10

v11

(Post-Redistricting)
a

v1

v2

a+q
2

v3 v4’

q

v5’ m’

v7

v8

v9

v10

v11

“Buy” these legislators
following redistricting

more ideologically compact while Republicans will
become more dispersed.13 Formally,
2
: New Democratic Party Std: Dev:
Hvotebuying
, Old Democratic Party Std: Dev:
3
Hvotebuying
: New Republican Party Std: Dev
. Old Republican Party Std: Dev:

Further extensions of vote buying, discussed below,
allow for legislators’ reservation prices to be influenced by their party affiliations.
Summary. Having extracted a number of competing hypotheses, two caveats are in order. First, our
hypotheses focus on redistricters who pursue legislative policy outputs that can be ordered on a leftright, unidimensional ideological spectrum. We do
not, that is, consider the possibility that there are
benefits apart from policy consequences that come
with a party acquiring majority status. In light of the
focus within contemporary Congressional studies on
13

By this same logic, if the vote recruiter advocates a relatively
extreme policy, so that the Democratic median is in the interval
xD 2 ½a þ2 q ; xm , then vote-buyer theories would suggest that the new
Democratic median would be more left-leaning in the new legislature in comparison to the old. In contrast, if the vote buyer
advocates a less ideologically extreme policy, then one would expect
no movement in the Democratic median. More formally, one would
predict that New Democratic Median # Old Democratic Median.
Likewise, if Democratic redistricters can feasibly replace Republicans
who are located to the right of the Republican Party Median with
Republicans legislators who are located to the left of the chamber
median, leftward movement in the Republican Party Median might
ensue: New Republican Median # Old Republican Median.

parties as legislative coalitions organized around
policy choices, we consider this view appropriate.
Second, a potential concern with our hypotheses is
that the theories motivating them address legislative
interactions that occur in one discrete time period, i.e.,
a legislative session. As such, extracting temporal
implications about the goals of partisan redistricters in
influencing legislative composition transcends their
direct implications. That being said, the theories are
sufficiently explicit that one can identify variables
correlated with increases in majority party utility.
Hence, the hypotheses we present are valid implications
for the goals of redistricters if a legislature operates in a
manner analogous to a majoritarian, strong party, or
vote-buying model.14 Our hypotheses are summarized
in Table 1 where the top row identifies a theory and
14

It is worth emphasizing that certain of our strong party
auxiliary hypotheses (H3, H4) rely on assumptions that transcend
Cox and McCubbins’s presentation of their theory, most notably
that the Democratic Party redistricter is to the left of the
Democratic Party Median. Given the ideological heterogeneity
of Democratic legislators noted below, combined with the fact
that four out of five of the Democrats on the Illinois Redistricting
Commission, including the tie breaker, Michael Bilandic, were
from Chicago, we believe that this assumption is reasonable. We
concede, however, that strong party theory would not necessarily
imply our hypotheses if these assumptions were not satisfied.
Hence, failure to find empirical support for these hypotheses
might not be an indictment of strong party theory so much as an
indictment of our assumptions. These caveats aside, we still
believe that it is worth exploring these matters in the data, to
identify what empirical regularities can be uncovered that might
be consistent with postulated hypotheses.

gerrymanders and theories of law making
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Summary of Hypotheses from Competing Theories

Post-redistricting Variable

Majoritarian

Strong Party

Vote-Buying

Chamber Median
Democratic (Maj.) Party Median
Democratic (Maj. Party) Std. Dev.
Republican (Min. Party) Std. Dev.
|Maj. Party Median2Chamber Median|

New , Old
No Prediction
No Prediction
No Prediction
No Prediction

New , Old
New , Old
No Prediction
No Prediction
New . Old

New , Old
No Prediction
New , Old
New . Old
No Prediction

Note: ‘‘Old’’ refers to preredistricting. The hypotheses assume that redistricters are dominated by Democrats and that legislator ideal
points are aligned so that politically left preferences are captured in small numbers, politically right preferences in large numbers.

the left-hand column identifies a summary statistic
predicted to change in a post-redistricting legislature.
Because none of the hypotheses directly contradict one
theory in favor of another, evidence pertaining to
them can support several theories simultaneously; this
can be viewed both as a weakness of our approach and
a statement about the inherent difficulty in distinguishing among the theories which are currently used
to characterize modern legislative processes. Moreover,
results motivated by the hypotheses in Table 1 might
actually be enlightening in that they could allow us to
identify how real-world legislative politics are actually
influenced by several theoretically relevant interests
rather than one exclusive interest.

The Post-2000 Redistricting Process
in Illinois
On September 5, 2001, Illinois Secretary of State Jesse
White reached into a replica of Abraham Lincoln’s
stovepipe hat, removed an envelope, and revealed
that Democrat Michael Bilandic would be the ninth
member of the Illinois Legislative Redistricting
Commission. From that point onward the Democratic
Party controlled the General Assembly redistricting
process.
As discussed in Wheeler (2002), the 1970 Illinois
Constitution establishes a timeline for adopting a
new state legislative redistricting policy whereby the
General Assembly has the default authority to
develop a new plan by June 30 following a decennial
census. If no plan is agreed to by such date, an eightmember bipartisan panel, called the Legislative Redistricting Commission, has until the following August
30 to propose a plan that receives at least minimal
majority support on the panel. If this latter deadline
is not met, the Illinois Supreme Court nominates two
individuals of different political parties to be the

potential tie-breaking vote. The actual tie breaker is
selected via lottery by September 5, and a final plan
must be filed by the Legislative Redistricting Commission with the Illinois Secretary of State by October 5.
The Commission operates by majority rule; thus, a
five to four advantage of one party over another can
have drastic consequences.15 Republicans won the tie
breaker in 1992, which presumably influenced the
legislative status quo whereby Democrats held a sixseat majority in the House, 62–56, but were underdogs in the Senate, 27–32.
Population growth and demographic shifts
between 1990 and 2000 provided a variety of opportunities for politically biased redistricting. During the
last decade of the twentieth century, Illinois’s total
population increased by almost 9%, and because of
unequal population growth across the state, districts
in 2001 ranged from approximately 80,000 to almost
190,000 residents. Furthermore, much of Illinois’s population growth had occurred in suburban regions,
leading to several urban districts, particularly those
that were majority African American, being far from
parity with the rest of the state (Wheeler 2002, 7).
Promulgation of the Democratic plan prompted
Republicans to file state and federal lawsuits arguing
that the proposed district map was invalid on
grounds ranging from district compactness to allegations of racial gerrymandering. As of May 2002, all
such lawsuits were decided in favor of the Democrats.
Despite the claim of one legislator (Cowlishaw 2001),
that ‘‘[T]he process [was] arbitrary, abhorrently
partisan, and a matter of raw power rather than
fairness for Illinois citizens,’’ the Democratic plan
governed the 2002 general election.

15

The courts have consistently ruled that this lottery-based tiebreaker contingency is legal and constitutional, and with the
exception of 1970, the legislature has never determined the
redistricting plan following the census.
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Data and Methods
To understand how the 2002 redistricting plan was
expected to affect the ideological composition of the
Illinois General Assembly, we first consider how
legislator ideologies map into pre-redistricting district demographics. Once we establish a pattern
between district demographics and legislator preferences, we then estimate how changes in district
demographics were expected to influence legislator
preferences in 2002 and consider the implications of
our estimates for expected changes in various variables of interest. More formally, we begin by estimating a model of the form:
Legislator i’s Ideology ¼
f ðLegislator i’s District Demographics; QÞ

ð1Þ

Because district demographics are of course related to
the redistricting plan in place (i.e., Legislator i’s
District Demographics 5 g(Legislator i’s District
Map)), estimating model (1) is tantamount to analyzing the following model:
Legislator i’s Ideology in 2000 ¼
ð1aÞ
f ðgðLegislator i’s District Map in 2000Þ; QÞ
^ we can then use these
Once we have estimated u,
estimates combined with the district demographics
from the redistricting maps to generate predicted and
projected ideal points for legislators elected to the
General Assembly before and after the 2002 redistricting, respectively:
Legislator i’s predicted ideology for 2000 5
f ðgðLegislator i’s 2000 district mapÞ; ^
uÞ

ð2aÞ

Legislator i’s projected ideology for 2002 5
f ðgðLegislator i’s 2002 district mapÞ; ^
uÞ

ð2bÞ

The predicted ideal points (i.e., scores) generated
from (2a) capture redistricters’ beliefs about the
relationship between district demographics and legislator preferences in 2000, while the scores generated
from (2b) capture redistricters’ expectations for the
new redistricting plan.
Our data on Illinois General Assembly district
demographics are drawn from manipulations of
publicly available census data at the block group
level, found in Census Summary File 3. Block groups
are the smallest units of aggregation for which
the census publishes data gleaned from long-form
questionnaires. In accordance with Public Law 94-171,

the census reports various racial demographics for
Illinois state legislative districts that existed in 2000.
These data do not, however, include many other
demographic variables, such as age and income
figures, tabulated at the block group level for state
legislative districts.
Thus, to generate income, age, and other demographics for our Illinois General Assembly districts (118 in the House, 59 in the Senate), we overlay
electronic maps of Illinois block groups and preredistricting House districts. We then aggregate block
group demographics to the House district level by
area.16 The number of Illinois Block Groups (9850) is
much larger than 118, and thus the majority of block
groups in our analysis lie completely inside single
Illinois House districts. We carry out a similar overlay of block groups and post-redistricting House
districts. We need not have a separate electronic overlay for Senate districts because Illinois state legislative districts are set up so that two House districts
together constitute one Senate district, e.g., House
Districts 1 and 2 comprise Senate District 1.
Our political variables are drawn from several
sources. Data on electoral outcomes and vote shares
are from 2002 and 2004 editions of the Almanac of
Illinois Politics (Van Dyke-Brown 2002, 2004). To
form ideology measures for Illinois legislators we use
the NOMINATE algorithm (Poole and Rosenthal
1997) to scale the roll-call votes cast in the 92nd
Illinois General Assembly for those House members
and Senators who were elected and sitting in 2000.
This procedure creates ideal point estimates that are
analogous to Congressional NOMINATE (technically
W-NOMINATE) scores. We ignore so-called ‘‘hurrah’’
votes that had fewer than 2.5% of voters supporting a
minority position.
We estimate all House and Senate NOMINATE
scores in a common space, and this allows us to
compare House and Senate scores. Our common
space is based on a collection of 158 nonhurrah joint
votes that occurred in both the House and Senate on
the same legislative matters.17 Combining these with
491 nonhurrah, House-only votes and 68 nonhurrah,
Senate-only votes allows us to generate common
space ideal point estimates for all members of the
Illinois General Assembly in 2000. For the purposes
16

In other words, if 75% of a given Illinois block group was in
House District 1, we assume that 75% of the block group’s total
income was earned in this district, that 75% of the block group’s
older residents are in this district, and so forth (e.g., Herron and
Theodos 2004).
17

Please see the appendix for further information regarding our
estimation of common-space NOMINATES.
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of scaling we treat the 92nd House and Senate as a
single legislative chamber and normalize our scores
so that negative scores are associated with what we
consider liberal voting records (usually these are
Democratic). Figures A1a–c and A2a–c in the appendix present histograms of NOMINATE scores for
House and Senate members, respectively.

Estimation
We begin our analysis by estimating a linear regression model for our scaled, common space NOMINATE scores with results in Table 2. Since our
collection of legislative districts has a natural spatial
component—each Illinois Senate district contains
exactly two House districts—we also estimated our
regression model with a spatial lag. Our spatial
weight matrix treats House district i and House
district j as neighbors if both districts i and j are in
the same Senate district, and it treats House district i
and Senate district j as neighbors if i is contained in j.
Test results (available from the authors) show spatial
effects at the boundary of statistical significance, i.e.,
typical p-values between 0.05 and 0.10. Since estimated regression slopes are highly similar regardless
of whether we include a spatial lag, we present nonspatial results.18
Our NOMINATE scores lie in the interior of the
NOMINATE policy space, and thus we do not use a
censored regression model.19 Recall that low NOMINATE scores represent liberal preferences; thus,
the negative and statistically significant estimate of
African American in Table 2 implies that the more
heavily African American a General Assembly district,
the more left-leaning the district’s legislator. The
Latino estimate has a similar interpretation. Table 2
also shows that urban districts and those with many
young residents produce liberal legislators.

18

We also estimated a spatial lag model where a (House or
Senate) district was deemed to be a neighbor of another (House
or Senate) district if their boundaries touched in a nontrivial way.
Trivial touchings were those that occurred when a vertex of one
district intersected with the boundary of another district. The
spatial regression results with this approach were nearly identical
to the results that do not allow for spatial effects.
19
The explicit specification chosen for Table 2 followed from
the consideration of several potential covariates and selecting
the model that provided the greatest fit for scaled legislator
preferences. It is worth noting that Party was statistically
insignificant once district demographics were controlled for.
Results from alternative specifications are available from the
authors.
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T ABLE 2

District-level Determinants of Legislator
NOMINATE Scores (Pre-Redistricting)

Variable
Constant
% Black
% Latino
% Middle Income Bracket
% Top Income Bracket
% Urban
% Farm
% Ages 1–17
% Age 65+
% Urban 3 % Age 1–17
% Urban 3 % Age 65+
Chicago
R2
F

8.64** (3.04)
20.67* (0.288)
20.94* (0.396)
2.79* (1.18)
1.02* (0.459)
210.70** (3.21)
27.45 (6.93)
229.90** (10.3)
29.68 (8.12)
34.00** (10.6)
10.40 (8.54)
20.15* (0.111)
0.44
11.88***

Note: N 5 177; estimated standard errors in parentheses;
*p,0.05; **p,0.01; ***p,0.001.

Drawing on our regressions we now estimate how
the Democratic redistricting plan sought to change
the ideological composition of the Illinois House and
Senate.20 As noted earlier, the Democrats maintained
control of the House and won control of the Senate
following the 2002 elections. New party breakdowns
were 66–52 and 32–26 in favor of Democrats in the
House and the Senate, respectively (with one Independent in the Senate). Table 3 (panel A) presents
descriptive statistics of predicted NOMINATE scores
for members elected in 2000 using the estimated
coefficients from Table 2 and the demographic data
from the district plan in effect in 2000; panel B
presents projected NOMINATE scores using the same
coefficients and the district demographics under the
redistricting plan for 2002. Note that in panel A House
Republicans appear more homogenous than the Democrats, with predicted Republican NOMINATE scores
having a standard deviation of 0.143 in contrast to the
Democrats with 0.334, which is consistent with the
actual distributions of the Democratic and Republican
NOMINATE scores as shown in the appendix.
20

One potential concern is that our method does not account for
the probability that a given legislator was a member of the
majority party at the same time that we estimate the impact of
district demographics on his or her ideology. Because one of the
primary goals of parties in strong party theory is acquiring and
maintaining majority party status, one would suspect that a
strong-party redistricter would simultaneously take into account
how redistricting affected the probability of maintaining majority
status and legislators’ expected preferences. Data limitations
prevent us from analyzing such an empirical specification, but
we recognize that it is worthy of future scholarship.
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T ABLE 3a

Descriptive Statistics of Predicted House NOMINATE Scores, 2000

Legislators

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

All
Democrats
Republicans

0.0663
20.124
0.277

0.192
20.0546
0.276

0.335
0.334
0.143

20.732
20.732
20.0651

0.630
0.450
0.630

Predicted NOMINATES calculated via fitted values using 2000 district data and regression results from Table 2 above.

T ABLE 3b

Descriptive Statistics for Projected House NOMINATE Scores, 2002

Legislators

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

All
Democrats
Republicans

0.0672
20.109
0.291

0.158
20.0790
0.297

0.323
0.323
0.163

20.701
20.701
20.0716

0.663
0.372
0.663

Projected NOMINATES calculated via fitted values using 2002 district data and regression results from Table 2 above.

T ABLE 3c

Differences between 2000 Predicted and 2002 Projected Ideal Points

Variable

Difference

Implication

95% CI

90% CI

Chamber Median
Democratic Median
Democratic Std. Dev.
Republican Std. Dev.
Republican Median
|Democratic Median2
Chamber Median|

20.034
20.024
20.011
0.020
0.021
20.0096

Moves leftward
Moves leftward
Heterogeneity Decreases
Heterogeneity Increases
Moves rightward
Difference contracts

(20.0543, 0.0150)
(20.0352, 0.0572)
(20.0301, 20.0121)
(0.0041, 0.0414)
(20.0139, 0.0498)
(20.0838, 0.0237)

(20.0472, 0.00942)
(20.0265, 0.0495)
(20.0284, 20.0138)
(0.0067, 0.0382)
(20.00896, 0.0434)
(20.0760, 0.0144)

The remainder of Table 3 presents an analysis of
the differences between the 2000 predicted and 2002
projected ideal points of the variables of interest with
bootstrap confidence intervals (panel C). We define
differences as 2002 values minus 2000 values. Thus,
positive differences in the locations of chamber and
party medians connote politically rightward movement, and a positive difference between majority
party and chamber medians connotes an expansion
in the interval between these two pivotal actors. Finally,
a positive difference in a party’s standard deviation
connotes an increase its ideological heterogeneity between General Assemblies. Table 4 presents analogous
results for predicted changes in the Illinois Senate.

Assessing Party Motives
Several points are evident regarding the impact of the
2002 redistricting. First, following implementation
of the Democratic redistricting plan Democrats expanded their control of the House and took control

of the Senate. Hence, some might argue that, consistent with the most fundamental implication of Cox
and McCubbins, the party controlling redistricting
acquired and maintained majority status, thereby
presumably enabling it to exert negative agenda
control. The crucial question for our analysis, however, is ‘‘was this the party’s primary intention?’’
Were the Democrats effectively acting like pure seat
maximizers? To identify whether Democratic redistricters developed a plan primarily aimed at securing
and maintaining majority status, we conducted the
following analysis. For all 177 Illinois General Assembly districts we estimated a probit regression where
the dependent variable indicated whether a Democrat
held the seat in 2000; corresponding independent
variables were the district demographics analyzed
in Table 2 (results presented in Table A1 in the
appendix). Second, for each post-redistricting General Assembly district we calculated the probability
that the district would have a Democrat in it based
on post-redistricting district demographics. Our analysis reveals that the estimated number of postredistricting Senate Democrats was approximately 32,
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Descriptive Statistics of Predicted Senate NOMINATE Scores, 2000

Legislators

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

All
Democrats
Republicans

0.0661
20.171
0.267

0.210
20.189
0.277

0.324
0.330
0.122

20.720
20.720
20.0431

0.537
0.374
0.587

Predicted NOMINATES calculated via fitted values using 2000 district data and regression results from Table 2 above.

T ABLE 4b

Descriptive Statistics for Projected Senate NOMINATE Scores, 2002

Legislators

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

All
Democrats
Republicans

0.0724
20.103
0.295

0.202
20.0394
0.321

0.316
0.321
0.110

20.699
20.699
0.0440

0.530
0.356
0.530

Projected NOMINATES calculated via fitted values using 2002 district data and regression results from Table 2 above.

T ABLE 4c

Differences Between 2000 Predicted and 2002 Projected Ideal Points

Variable
Chamber Median
Democratic Median
Democratic Std. Dev.
Republican Std. Dev.
Republican Median
|Dem. Median2Chamber Median|

Differences

Implication

95% CI

90% CI

20.008
0.2284
20.009
0.022
0.044
20.236

Moves leftward
Moves rightward
Heterogeneity Decreases
Heterogeneity Decreases
Moves rightward
Difference contracts

(20.0454, 0.0361)
(0.0211, 0.2510)
(20.0242, 0.0081)
(20.0422, 0.0253)
(20.0104, 0.0700)
(20.269, 20.0146)

(20.0386, 0.0284)
(0.0317, 0.228)
(20.0218, 0.0053)
(20.0367, 0.0202)
(20.00479, 0.0623)
(20.245, 20.0271)

and the estimated number of post-redistricting
House Democrats, approximately 64. Hence, based
solely on point estimates, the Democratic redistricters
expected to gain five Senate seats (giving them the
majority) and gain two House seats (expanding their
majority).
To assess the statistical significance of these
findings, we calculated bootstrap 95% confidence
intervals for expected post-redistricting seat shares,
and the intervals were relatively wide. For the Senate
(recall, 59 total seats), the expected number of
Democratic legislators was between 25 and 33 and
for the House (118 total seats) the expected number
of Democrats was between 54 and 67. This means
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
redistricting plan was not expected to increase Democratic Party seat share in each chamber.
Similarly, based on our bootstrap iterations, we
calculated 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the
probability that the Senate and House would be
under Democratic control post-redistricting. Both
such confidence intervals spanned the entire unit
interval, i.e., zero through one. Again, this suggests
that seat maximization cannot explain Illinois redistricters’ choices. Hence, while the Democratic Party

clearly gained control of the Senate and expanded
their control of the House following redistricting, it is
not clear that these results followed from a concerted
effort on the part of the redistricters.
Moving beyond the party control/seat maximization hypothesis, the results in Tables 3 and 4
identify several predicted changes in the ideological
makeup of both chambers. First, the House median
was predicted to move slightly leftward (become
more liberal) in the 2002 General Assembly, which
is consistent with majoritarian, strong party, and
vote-buying theories; second, the standard deviations
of the Democratic and Republican parties were
predicted to decrease and increase, respectively,
which is consistent with the implications of vote
buying; and third, while the Democratic Party
median was predicted to move leftward, consistent
with the implications of strong party theory, the
difference between the majority party median and
the chamber median was predicted to decrease in the
2002 General Assembly. Hence, while the Democratic
Party median was predicted to move leftward, the
range of policies that the Democratic leadership
could keep from floor consideration would be narrower than prior to redistricting, and this runs
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counter to a secondary implication of strong party
theory.21
In considering the extent to which the above
changes are significant, note that the value of zero is
contained in both 95% and 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals for changes in the chamber and
party medians. In other words, there is no compelling
evidence that there were expected changes in their
locations between the 2000 and 2002 General Assemblies. In contrast, changes in the standard deviations
of both House Democrats and Republicans are
significant, indicating that redistricters sought to
make Democrats and Republicans more and less
ideologically cohesive, respectively, following redistricting. As noted in Figure 3, such changes are
consistent with the implications of vote buying in
that redistricters would seek to make potential vote
recruits as amenable to generic left-leaning policies as
possible, in order to minimize bribes paid.
In turning to the Senate, we see in Table 4c that,
similar to the House, the Senate median was predicted to move leftward, the standard deviation of the
Democratic Party was predicted to decrease, and the
distance between the Democratic Party and Senate
median was predicted to contract. Moreover, the
Senate Democratic Party median was predicted to
move rightward, and the standard deviation of the
Senate Republican Party was predicted to increase.
Furthermore, from a statistical standpoint, many of
the predicted Senate changes are significant by conventional standards. In particular, predicted rightward movement of the Democratic Party median and
contraction of the distance between the Democratic
median and the Senate median are significant. The
change in the overall Senate median, similar to
the House, is of marginal significance, and unlike
the House, changes in party standard deviations are
insignificant.
Similar to the House, these results neither support nor refute majoritarian theories but they, particularly rightward movement in the Democratic
Party median, are potentially problematic for strong
party theory. Unlike our House results, our Senate
findings do not offer obvious support for vote-buying
theories as we are unable to reject the null that there
were no changes in any of our quantities of interest.
Insight can be gleaned, however, by considering predicted changes in party medians, both of which were
predicted to move rightward as noted in Table 4c.
21

To reemphasize a point above, however, it is difficult to infer
whether these findings fail to support strong party theory or
rather reflect the fact that redistricters’ policy preferences are
inconsistent with our assumptions.
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Given the purported stability of the overall chamber
medians, these shifts in party medians suggest that,
while Democrats gained membership due in part
to the post-2000 redistricting, they did not gain
members who were expected to be particularly leftleaning. That is, by picking off the most moderate
(left-leaning) members of the Republican Party,
Democrats effectively fattened up their ranks with
legislators who were Republicans in everything but
name.
While not obvious, such a strategy is consistent
with vote buying to the extent that one believes that it
is cheaper for party leaders to buy the votes of
members of their own party rather than those of
the other party. More formally, assume that a
legislator’s preferences over policy and bribes can be
expressed as the following: Ui 5 ðxi  xÞ2 þ ab,
where a . 1 if the legislator is of the same party as
the vote buyer and 0 # a # 1 if the legislator is of the
opposing party as the vote buyer. To minimize total
bribes paid, a vote buyer might no longer seek to
bribe all members between the status quo cutpoint
aþq
2 and xm as some members to the right of xm might
be less costly than some legislators in the interior of
this interval, depending on their party affiliations. As
illustrated in the top of Figure 4, a partisan gerrymanderer would be concerned not only with the
location of the median voter vis-à-vis left-leaning
policies but also about the party affiliation of members around the median. Hence, holding ideological
positions constant, a Democratic gerrymanderer
would be most interested in converting those members on the left-hand tail of the distribution of the
Republican Party to Democrats, leading to rightward
shifts in both party medians, precisely what we
observed in the Illinois Senate.
A glance at several legislative races supports this
perspective. One of the most hotly contested Senate
races in 2002 occurred in an affluent, northern
suburb of Chicago (Northbrook) in Senate District
29, where incumbent Republican Kathleen Parker ran
against Susan Garret, a Democrat. Both parties
donated heavily to the race, with Republicans contributing over $650,000 to Parker’s reelection efforts
and Democrats contributing nearly $695,000 to
Garret’s campaign. Parker was defeated by Garret,
56% to 44 %, and consistent with our arguments
Parker was the most liberal Republican senator in
2000 with a predicted NOMINATE of 0.214. Furthermore, given the district demographics following
redistricting, Garret was predicted to be one of
the most conservative Democratic Senators with a
NOMINATE score of 0.217.
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Vote-Recruitment Strategies under ‘‘Partisan’’ Vote-Buying Theory
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Similarly, the 47th Senate seat race between
incumbent Republican Laura Kent Donahue and
Democrat John M. Sullivan was also very tight
(51.5% to 48.5%, with Sullivan winning). Moreover,
Donahue was among the most centrist Republicans,
with a predicted NOMINATE score of 0.290, whereas
our model predicts that Sullivan would be among the
most conservative Democrats, with a projected
NOMINATE of 0.324. These and other races paint
a picture of liberal Republicans being systematically
targeted for replacement by conservative Democrats.
Further consideration of the Illinois political
system lends additional support to our claim that
legislative vote buying occurs. Illinois parties contribute substantial amounts of hard money directly to
candidates’ campaigns, and large amounts of cash are
funneled through leadership campaign committees
directly into candidates’ campaign war chests.22
Hence, potential vote recruiters have resources with
which to buy votes, and these resources are more
valuable to members of their own party than the
competing party—the Democratic Party would presumably not contribute to Republican legislators’
campaigns to reward them for voting with the
Democrats on salient votes. To the extent that campaign dollars insulate incumbents from potential
22
In the 1996 Senate race for the 58th District, for example, 77%
of the $1.34 million spent in the race by the candidates came
from party leadership committees (Redfield 1998, 3).

challengers, such funds could provide an exceptional
carrot for recruiting votes on key measures.23 This
scenario provides an interesting counterpoint to the
U.S. Congress where parties do not make hard money
contributions, and it suggests that further examination of the role of parties in the electoral arena, and
its impact on legislative organization and party
discipline, is worthwhile.
To revisit our point above, skeptics might argue
that while our findings are consistent with vote
buying, perhaps they are simply an artifact of a
straightforward seat-maximization strategy. In other
words, perhaps Democrats targeted those legislators
around the chamber medians because they were the
easiest to convert from Republican to Democrat (or
from slightly right leaning to slightly left leaning)
because they were the most electorally vulnerable,
and it had nothing to do with vote-buying strategies,
per se.
To the extent that such a seat-maximizing perspective is valid, we would expect to see a relationship

23

One potential concern with this argument is that if vote buying
is occurring then the NOMINATE scores are likely tainted by this
influence, precisely in the area of the legislature that is most
relevant to this exercise (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001;
Snyder and Groseclose 2000). The fact that parties exhibit notable
intraparty heterogeneity suggests that a sizeable number of votes
are not the subject of such pressure and that NOMINATE scores
are reasonably accurate cardinal rankings of legislator ideologies.
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between Republican legislator ideology and electoral
security. Empirical investigation reveals, however,
that this is not the case, as the correlation between
a Republican legislator’s NOMINATE and his/her
two-party vote share in the election prior to redistricting is only 0.11 (p-value of 0.39).24 Hence, there
is no obvious reason why the Democrats chose liberal
Republicans for seat conversion or ideological tweaking in that they were not the easiest to convert or
influence.25

After the Fact: Some Evidence on the
Veracity of Our Preference Measures
Our conclusions regarding the goals of Democratic
redistricters in Illinois rest on whether we have
accounted for the mapping between district demographics and legislator ideologies. If the specification
of the regression in Table 2 is poor, then our
estimates for members’ predicted NOMINATE scores
will be wrong and the inferences we draw flawed.26
Consideration of the relationships between legislators’ predicted NOMINATE scores for the 93rd
General Assembly and their actual NOMINATE
scores from that General Assembly allows us to assess
whether our method has face validity. More specifically, by scaling common space NOMINATE scores
for the 93rd General Assembly with roll-call data from
the 2003–2004 legislative session in a manner analogous to what we did for the 92nd Assembly, we can
see how legislators’ actual NOMINATE scores in the
24

Furthermore, the correlation between a Republican legislator’s
predicted NOMINATE and his/her two-party vote share in the
election prior to redistricting is only 2.02 (p-value of .77).
25

Further insight can be gleaned by analyzing the bias of the
electoral system (Cox and Katz 2002, 31–34). In the 2000
elections Democrats competing for contested House seats won
56.1% of the vote yet won only 52.1% of the contested seats.
After redistricting however, Democrats won 54.1% of the House
votes for contested seats, and captured 56.7% of the contested
seats, generating a 2.6 point pro-Democratic bias in the system,
which was less than the previous pro-Republican bias. In the
Senate elections following redistricting, Democrats won 46.9% of
the ballots cast in contested races yet only won 42.8% of the
contested seats. Hence, it appears that there was actually an antiDemocratic bias of nearly 4 points in the Illinois Senate
redistricting plan. While far from conclusive evidence, these
statistics raise further questions regarding the veracity of the
seat-maximizing hypothesis.
26
It is worth noting that the R2 is 0.44, which implies that there is
still a good deal of residual forecasting error that we are unable to
account for. Given this residual error, we are (ironically) even
more confident that the significant changes we identify in the
variables of interest do not reflect random noise.
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93rd General Assembly were related to their predicted
scores as projected from Table 2.27
To illustrate, consider the Parker-Garret and
Donahue-Sullivan races for the 29th and 47th Senate
seats, respectively; recall we predicted that in the 93rd
General Assembly Garret would be one of the most
conservative Democratic senators and Sullivan would
be the second most conservative Democrat. In reality,
we find that Garret’s 93rd NOMINATE score placed
her as the third-most conservative Democratic senator, whereas Sullivan was the most conservative
Democrat. Hence, for these theoretically pivotal races
located near the legislative median, we find that the
ordinal rankings of our predicted NOMINATEs for
the 93rd General Assembly are quite similar to
members’ actual rankings based on roll calls cast.
This lends credibility to our inferences regarding
predicted changes in chamber and party medians.

Caveats and Conclusions
Conventional wisdom dictates that those in control
of legislative redistricting create new district maps to
benefit their political interests. Moving beyond the
relationship between election returns and partisan
seat shares, we have focused on the recent redistricting for the Illinois General Assembly with the goal of
identifying whether the state’s Democratic Party tried
to generate with a district map a legislature that was
favorable to its policy interests. Our linking district
demographics to election outcomes and legislator
ideologies has allowed us to create before and anticipated after snapshots of the General Assembly, and
the results that emerged speak to broad questions on
the nature of parties in government.
With respect to the validity of competing theories, our findings are mixed yet insightful. We find no
evidence that clearly refutes majoritarian theories of
legislative policymaking, but at the same time the
stability of chamber medians we have identified does
little to support majoritarian theories. With regards
to Cox and McCubbins’s strong party theory, the
most fundamental prediction with regards to redistricting is clearly borne out in the data: the party that
controlled redistricting acquired and maintained
majority status. At the same time, however, our
analysis suggests that the Democrats’ acquisition
and maintenance of majority status in the House
and Senate was not necessarily intentional. Moreover,
27

It is not possible to compare relevant medians across time
without strong identifying assumptions.
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we demonstrate that in both chambers the distance
between Democratic party median and chamber
median was predicted to contract, not expand,
following redistricting, and this predicted contraction
is statistically significant in the Senate. Combined
with a predicted rightward movement in the Democratic party median these findings seem to undermine
some of the fundamental policy motives of a party
that exerts negative agenda control.
That said, there are several reasons not to dismiss
strong party theory. First, the empirical specification of
our first-stage estimation does not account for the
probability that a given legislator will be Republican or
Democrat, independent of his or her ideal point.
Because Cox and McCubbins argue that majority party
control is tantamount to all party goals, it is plausible
that the redistricting plan implemented in 2002 was the
best the Democrats could do to acquire and expand
their majority status. Hence, they may have been
willing to sacrifice policy gains to acquire and maintain
agenda control, which we do not account for. Second,
to reemphasize a caveat noted above, the implications
tested here go beyond the scope of the most straightforward presentation of strong party theory insofar as
it speaks to legislative politics within one legislative
session. Hence, it is possible that the cross-time
predictions we tested are not the most appropriate
implications of strong party models, and we should be
looking elsewhere for evidence, or lack thereof, of the
presence of negative agenda power.
While there are potential complications with
strong party theories, our results offer support for
vote-buying theories in that there is a significant
decrease and increase in the standard deviations of
the House Democrats and Republicans, respectively,
which is consistent with the prediction that potential
vote buyers would try to structure the new districts so
that legislators near the medians of both parties
would be more left-leaning than their predecessors.
While similar changes are not observed in the Senate,
it is nonetheless clear that redistricters sought to
convert more moderate and left-leaning Republicans
to Democrats, thereby contributing to rightward
shifts in both party medians. The fact that these
members were not obviously the easiest to convert
based on prior election returns suggests that such
conversions were not consistent with simple Democratic seat maximization. Furthermore, such efforts
are consistent with the goals of a vote buyer who
could buy his own party members’ votes for less than
competing party members.
Taken together, our results suggest that while it
may not be the case that parties in Illinois have no
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influence in legislative politics à la majoritarianism,
their influence is somewhat less than that of a
procedural Leviathan. To the extent that policymaking is influenced by legislative vote-buying, one
implication of our findings is that any influence that
parties might have over legislative politics seems
intimately tied to their influence over members’
electoral fortunes.
We conjecture that variation across states in the
strength of party organizations should translate into
different goals for partisan redistricters, which in turn
should translate into consequences for legislative
composition following redistricting. The method we
advance provides a technique for identifying the goals
of partisan redistricters, and we argue that finding
such variation in different states and legislative
systems would support the validity of our technique
as well as enhance our understanding of the connections between the role of parties in the electoral
arena and legislative organization and politics. This
approach can be applied to virtually any redistricting
setting, and so long as the connection between
redistricting and legislative outcomes is not confounded by the actions of players outside of the
political system (e.g., the actions of other states), this
methodology can facilitate a greater understanding of
the nature of and connections between legislative and
electoral politics in democratic systems.
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